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Professional Obligation and the Duty to
Rescue: When Must a Psychiatrist
Protect His Patient's Intended Victim?
Three state court decisions' have held that psychiatrists2 must warn po-
tential victims of the violence threatened by their patients.' These deci-
sions have created a new exception to the long-standing general rule,
based on respect for individual liberty, that an individual is not required
to take affirmative steps to rescue others from danger. These state court
decisions justified overriding the liberty principle by extending the "spe-
cial relationships" rationale for affirmative duties to the psychiatrist-pa-
tient relationship, and by the policy argument that imposing such a duty
1. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976);
McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979); Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102
Cal. App. 3d 594, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1981).
The Tarasoff case evolved as follows: In August 1969, Prosenjit Poddar was a voluntary psychiatric
outpatient receiving therapy at the University of California's Cowell Memorial Hospital. He told his
therapist, Dr. Lawrence Moore, of his plan to kill a young woman named Tatiana Tarasoff when she
returned home from summer vacation. Dr. Moore orally notified campus police and later sent a letter
requesting their assistance in detaining Poddar. The police took Poddar into custody but soon released
him, after somehow satisfying themselves that he would stay away from his intended victim. No
subsequent attempt was made to commit Poddar, who had broken all connections with the hospital
and had ended therapy after the incident with the campus police. On October 27, 1969, Poddar
murdered Tatiana Tarasoff. The California Supreme Court held that a complaint against the defen-
dant therapists, asserting that they had determined that the daughter's killer presented a danger of
violence to her, or should have so determined, but nonetheless failed to exercise reasonable care to
protect her from that danger, stated a cause of action upon which relief could be granted.
In McIntosh v. Milano, Dr. Michael Milano, a licensed psychiatrist, treated Lee Morgenstein.
During weekly sessions over a period of two years, Morgenstein related fantasies that included the use
of a knife to threaten people. Morgenstein also told Milano that he had bought and carried a knife to
scare away threatening people and in fact showed the knife to Milano. Further, Morgenstein de-
scribed a sexual relationship with Kimberly McIntosh, and Milano knew that Morgenstein had fired
a BB gun at a car belonging to either Miss McIntosh or her boyfriend in anger over her seeing other
men.
In July 1975, Morgenstein stole a blank prescription from Dr. Milano's desk and tried to purchase
thirty Seconal tablets at a pharmacy. The pharmacist was suspicious and called Milano, who told the
pharmacist not to fill the prescription and to send Morgenstein home. Morgenstein returned home to
get a handgun, and went to the McIntosh house where he intercepted Kimberly on her way home. He
took her to a park where he shot her in the back.
Robert Mavroudis attacked his parents with a hammer, causing multiple injuries. Mavroudis v.
Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1981). His parents sued several parties
(Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Mayor's Help Hospital, Redwood House, and County of San Mateo)
who had treated Robert for mental disorders on the theory that those parties knew or reasonably
should have known that Robert posed a danger to them.
2. In this Note, the terms "psychotherapist," "therapist," and "psychiatrist" are used interchange-
ably. The difference among the terms (for example, a psychiatrist is an M.D.) is not material to the
arguments.
3. The only other reported case ruling on this legal question, Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App.
718, 415 A.2d 625 (1980), neither accepted nor rejected the extension of liability because it ruled that,
as a factual matter, the patient never threatened the plaintiff.
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on psychiatrists promotes public safety.
This Note examines the reasoning used in these decisions to support
expansion of the warning requirement, and concludes that these courts
have failed to provide a principled justification for departing from the
law's general refusal to require rescue. The Note reformulates the duty by
developing an alternative theory of liability, "the principle of professional
obligation." This principle would require a person who enters an occupa-
tion in which he reasonably can expect to have an increased chance of
finding a helpless or endangered person to take affirmative steps to protect
such a person. The Note marshals common-law analogies and the juris-
prudence of Ronald Dworkin 4 to advance this principle as law. The Note
concludes by proposing a standard to trigger the psychiatrist's duty, and
by indicating how a psychiatrist would discharge this duty.
I. The Need for Principled Justification for the Psychiatrist's Duty to
Rescue
In the absence of principled justification, judicial decisions lack legiti-
macy. A brief review of the nature of a principled justification, and of the
principles underlying the law's general rule refusing to require rescue,
clarifies the reasoning that would justify exceptions to the general rule.
Examination of the cases imposing a duty to warn on psychiatrists demon-
strates that these cases have failed to employ such reasoning.
A. The Nature of Principled Justifications
The jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin rejects the positivist contention
that "law" consists only of the "rules" of the black-letter sort found in
textbooks and enunciated as holdings in particular cases. Law also in-
cludes a system of principles, underlying standards of justice, fairness, and
morality. A principle is "law" if it is part of the soundest theory that
coherently justifies the explicit rules of a given jurisdiction.'
Dworkin also rejects the utilitarian contention that judicial decisions
4. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 15-130 (1978); Dworkin, No Right Answer? 53
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1978).
5. Courts find legal validity not simply in the existence of a rule, but in the relationship between
the propositions advanced in a particular case and the larger system of principles from which legal
arguments are drawn. Rules are part of that system, but they are binding only when the system of
principles supplies grounds for applying them, and that system may prescribe answers when no prior
rule applies. See Dworkin, supra note 4, at 1. Implicit in the role of principles in judicial reasoning is
that they become relevant to a case because they are derived from a coherent and tenable "political
theory," a system marked by the interdependency of its propositions. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 4,
at 86-88, 101-23. Given this interdependency, anomaly provides the occasion to change or eliminate a
rule. C T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 52-65 (1970) (anomaly will be
excised or paradigm replaced).
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should be based on policy considerations. In contrast to arguments of
principle, which aim to establish individual rights, arguments of policy are
intended to advance or secure collective goals that may be economic, politi-
cal, or social.
Judicial decisions characteristically are, and should be, generated by ar-
guments of principle, not policy. 7 First, under our system of government,
judges are insulated from the demands of the political majority. As Alex-
ander Bickel has observed, judges are therefore better qualified to evaluate
arguments of principle than arguments of policy, since the latter attempt
to balance competing goals in the effort to improve the welfare of the
overall community. A legislature composed of elected representatives is
better equipped to assess such policy arguments.8
Second, equal distribution of rights is deeply engrained in our concep-
tions of justice.' In order to treat each person equally, a judge must em-
ploy arguments that justify entitlements coherently; that is, he must rea-
son through principles."0 Policies, on the other hand, are aggregative.
Treating individuals alike need not be part of a responsible strategy for
reaching an aggregate goal. That is, legislatures but not courts can choose
to regulate one harm but not others on the basis of policy considerations.1
Respect for the genius of the structure of our government and for equality
of rights, forbids a judge from considering majoritarian policies in decid-
ing a case.
Finally, principles have a dimension that rules do not-the dimension
of weight or importance. 2 When principles conflict, legal reasoning serves
to resolve the conflict by examining analogous cases to determine which
6. Wealth-maximization theory shares the faith in policy analysis with utilitarianism, though
wealth-maximization would assess the policy implications of a proposed rule by different criteria.
Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979). But c.
Kronman, Wealth-Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980) (wealth
maximization has none of virtues and all of vices of utilitarianism); Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value? 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980) (social wealth is neither component nor instrument of value).
7. R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 81-105.
8. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 84-86; A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 23-28
(1962).
9. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28-35 (1974); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUS-
TICE 60 (1971).
10. This jurisprudence not only rejects the validity of judicial use of policy argument, but also
rejects the positivist contention that, when no explicit rule governs, a judge may decide a rule from his
own personal preferences. In order to respect individual rights equally, judges must employ principled
arguments. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 22-39.
11. Another objection to policy arguments applies with considerably less force to principled argu-
ments. Policy decisions are not rooted in existing law; when courts apply policy to cases in which no
explicit rule governs, the law operates retroactively. By emphasizing principles, the judge employs
justifications that already are embedded in the law even when he establishes new, explicit rules. Be-
cause principles coherently explain analogous cases, the plaintiff has a right to a particular decision.
See R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 84-86.
12. Id. at 26.
1432
Vol. 91: 1430, 1982
Duty to Rescue
principles have proven weightier than others." Ad hoc and expedient pol-
icy balancing, in contrast, is an unsatisfactory mode of analysis that leaves
too much to the personal preferences of judges, 4  and- permits
inconsistency.
B. The General Refusal to Require Rescue
Two principles traditionally embraced by the common law, the liberty
principle and the Good Samaritan principle, are relevant to the creation of
a psychiatrist's duty to warn. The law's general refusal to require rescue
reflects the central importance of liberty as a principle in tort law. 5 A
major task of the legal system is to define the boundaries of individual
liberty. 6 Respect for liberty requires recognizing that by making a broad
choice a person can bind himself to certain future requirements. Some of
those requirements are explicit; others exist when certain factual condi-
tions or emergencies arise as part of the general undertaking even though
the person may not have agreed to or thought about them explicitly. In
contract, for instance, a seaman is expected to make extra efforts in the
event that fellow seamen desert; he is deemed compensated for the risk of
such emergencies by his original contract. 7 In tort, once one chooses to
drive a car, for instance, he must exercise reasonable care to avoid hitting
pedestrians."
Whether the law should require affirmative duties of rescue, and under
what circumstances, is an enduring area of debate. In the rescue context,
the principle of liberty conflicts with the "Good Samaritan" moral obliga-
tion to assist others. 9 The Good Samaritan principle is subservient to the
liberty principle and thus generally has not created legal duties. Other-
wise, requiring a person to act affirmatively for the benefit of another
would make him, in effect, the "uncompensated servant of another.120 To
13. Id. at 26-28.
14. Id. at 31-39.
15. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Fletcher, Fairness
and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REV. 537 (1972). Cf J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60
(1971) (first principle of justice is that individuals have equal right to most extensive liberty compati-
ble with similar liberty for others).
16. See Epstein, supra note 15, at 203.
17. See Stilk v. Myrick, 2 Camp. 317 (1809).
18. See Weinrib, The Case For a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 252 (1980); Linden,
Torts-Nonfeasance-Rescue and Foreseability, 48 CAN. B. REV. 541, 542 (1970). Some jurisdic-
tions, notably Vermont, have passed statutes to give legal effect to the Good Samaritan principle. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (Supp. 1971). See Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25
STAN. L. REV. 51 (1972).
19. For examples of thejudicial use of Good Samaritan arguments to create affirmative duties, see
Farwell v. Keaton, 396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (1976); Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry Co., 262
Mo. 560, 172 S.W. 43 (1914).
20. See Hale, Prima Fade Torts, Combination, and Non-feasance, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 196, 214
(1946). While the principal intellectual foundations of this position are Kantian, some utilitarian
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require a person to rescue others would deprive him of the right to choose
how to use his labor, and the right to compensation for his labor and risk.
The law generally has protected these liberties by upholding freedom of
contract values; a victim cannot conscript a rescuer's services, but must
purchase them under the usual contractual mechanisms.2
Coupled with the liberty argument against affirmative duties is an ar-
gument that "once one decides that as a matter of statutory or common
law duty, an individual is required under some circumstances to act at his
own cost for the exclusive benefit of another, then it is very hard to set out
in a principled manner the limits of social interference .. .."" This par-
ticular slippery slope leads in at least two directions. First, once a duty is
imposed in one set of circumstances, it is difficult to delimit the duty short
of imposing it in a large number of circumstances that may be difficult to
distinguish successfully, including a legal requirement for large-scale
wealth distribution.2 Second, within any particular rescue situation, more
than one potential rescuer might be available; consistency seems to dictate
that if one of those potential rescuers is liable, then all should be.2
Respect for the liberty principle and recognition of the difficulty of set-
ting principled limits to affirmative duties have proven formidable obsta-
cles to establishing such duties. The swimmer who sees another drowning
before his eyes, for example, is not required to do anything about it and
may watch the person drown. 25 Similarly, the law does not require anyone
to bind up the wounds of a stranger bleeding to death,26 to prevent a
theorists also have concluded that liberty supersedes a duty to rescue others. For Kant, to require one
person to come to the rescue of another would be to direct the will of the rescuer by the will of the
victim, violating the universal law of freedom. I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 0
(J. Ladd trans. 1965). The chief utilitarian adherent of this position was William Godwin. See 1. W.
GODWIN, ENQUIRY CONCERNING POLITICAL JUSTICE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON GENERAL VIRTUE AND
HAPPINESS 165-327 (I. Krammick ed. 1976). Godwin argued that individuals should respect each
person's right to private judgment, a right that is essential for the development of the person's moral
capacities. The function of government is to ensure that the exercise of each individual's private judg-
ment does not intrude upon his neighbor's equal right to private judgment. Id. at 198, 234. The
government may legitimately prevent one person from harassing another, because harm impairs the
exercise of private judgment; it may not, however, legitimately force one person to benefit another,
even though that might be morally required, because such coercion would violate the right to private
judgment.
21. See Weinrib, supra note 18, at 276. See generally M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM
7-21 (1962) (economic freedom has intrinsic value, and is indispensable to political freedom).
22. Epstein, supra note 15, at 198. Kant saw no distinction between the moral duty to effect an
easy rescue in an emergency and the moral duty to help the needy. I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL
PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE 49 (M. Gregor trans. 1964).
23. See Weinrib, supra note 18, at 272.
24. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 341 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser characterized
this as "the difficulties of setting any standards of unselfish service to fellow men, and of making any
workable rule to cover possible situations where fifty people might fail to rescue one ... "
25. Handiboe v. McCarthy, 114 Ga. App. 541, 151 S.E.2d 905 (1966); Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa.
316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959).
26. Riley v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co., 160 S.W. 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
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neighbor's child from hammering a dangerous explosive, 27 to prevent a
train from blocking a fire engine on its way to a fire.28
The legal principles that allow a person to stand by and to observe
another perish have long plagued judges and scholars with chronic moral
discomfort.29 In certain unusual circumstances the law has carved out ex-
ceptions that overcome application of the liberty principle and yield to the
Good Samaritan principle of rescue." In these situations, potential rescu-
ers have been held accountable for failure to rescue because of a "special
relationship" with the victim.
As commentators have noted, many of these "special relationships" ex-
ceptions respond in a principled way to the problem of the uncompensated
servant, thus obviating the typical requirement of a contract to rescue.31
One well-established and principled category consists of business relation-
ships,32 such as shopkeeper-business visitor,3 inn-keeper-guest, 4 and car-
rier-passenger.5 For instance, a carrier is required to rescue a passenger
who, at no fault of the carrier, has fallen off the train. 6 In these situa-
tions, the law has deemed the defendant's liberty sufficiently protected be-
cause he (1) has made the general choice of how to employ his labor by
voluntarily entering a line of business, (2) can reasonably foresee that
other people will need particular forms of affirmative protection associated
with the running of that business, and (3) can adjust his compensation to
cover the potential costs of providing protection in ways that are unavaila-
ble to the uncompensated servant. 7 The law in these circumstances has
found that liberty values are sufficiently preserved to allow the Good Sa-
maritan principle to prevail.
27. Sidwell v. MeVay, 282 P.2d 756 (Okla. 1955).
28. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Scruggs & Echols, 161 Ala. 97, 49 So. 399 (1909).
29. Prosser has characterized these exceptions as "revolting to any moral sense." W. PROSSIER,
supra note 24, at 341.
30. For a summary of these exceptions, see id. at 341-46; Weinrib, supra note 18, at 270-72.
31. One of these is family duties. The common law has traditionally held that family agreements
are outside the realm of contracts. See Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571, 579 (C.A.). Moreover,
statutory requirements that certain family members supply necessities of life to those within their
charge are common. See Sommers v. Putnam Bd. of Educ., 113 Ohio 177, 148 N.E. 682 (1925);
Weinrib, supra note 18, at 271.
32. See Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV.
217, 230 (1908); McNiece & Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272 (1949).
33. Harold's Club v. Sanchez, 70 Nev. 518, 275 P.2d 384 (1954).
34. Dove v. Lowden, 47 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. Missouri 1942).
35. Yu v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 145 Conn. 451, 144 A.2d 56 (1958).
36. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Byrd, 89 Miss. 308, 42 So. 286 (1906).
37. In a seminal article on the law on affirmative duty, Francis Bohlen identified these factors as
"volition" and "reward." Bohlen, supra note 32, at 217, 229-31. Professor Bohlen's formulation,
while helpful, is imprecise. It is clear from Bohlen's examples that by "volition" he means the process
of making a general choice of entering an occupation or line of business, and by "reward" he means a
payment analogous to that received under a contract, not other conceivable rewards (such as emotional
gratification). Id. at 227-31.
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For many other "special relationships," discovering a principled basis
for the duty to rescue is much more problematical. Often these "princi-
ples" seem to reflect nothing more than the idiosyncratic moral intuitions
of particular judges?8
C. The Psychiatrist's Duty to Warn
The recent California and New Jersey cases imposing a duty to warn
on psychiatrists rely primarily upon an extension of the "special relation-
ships" doctrine.39 The California court tried to buttress its imposition of a
duty to warn potential victims by arguing that this duty will help protect
the public from peril.40 Neither of these approaches provides a satisfactory
principled rationale for imposing upon psychiatrists a duty to warn poten-
tial victims.
There is no theoretical foundation to support the extension of the spe-
cial relationships doctrine to psychiatrists. The courts have held that be-
cause of the psychiatrist's "special" relationship with the patient, he owes
a duty to the victim, but they have not explained precisely what is "spe-
cial" about the relationship that creates affirmative duties, or how the
duty addresses the problem of the uncompensated servant. Instead, the
courts have relied solely on analogous precedents to support their conclu-
38. In Farwell v. Keaton, 396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (1976), for instance, the father of the
decedent brought a wrongful death action against a young man who had been the decedent's social
companion on the evening when the decedent received a fatal beating. The majority characterized the
defendant's failure to obtain medical assistance or at least to notify someone as "shocking to humani-
tarian considerations," as such failures "fly in the face of 'the commonly accepted code of human
conduct' ". The majority parenthetically noted that a "special relationship" existed between the par-
ties, and without explaining what elements of that relationship resembled other "special" relation-
ships, extended the doctrine to social companions.
Some cases speak at length about legal obligation in purely humanitarian terms, blur distinctions,
and include the "special relationship" as an afterthought. See, e.g., Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry Co.,
262 Mo. 560, 172 S.W. 43 (1914).
The breadth of the relationships that have qualified for the apparently narrow designation of "spe-
cial" may be seen in Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968) (state-
foster parent); Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp., 67 Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d 193, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1967)
(hospital-patient); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953) (parent-babysitter);
Pirkle v. Oakdale Union Grammar School, 116 Cal. App. 2d 140, 253 P.2d 1 (1953) (school-pupil);
Sparks v. Ober, 192 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1966) (tavern owner-business invitee); Thomas v. Williams, 105
Ga. App. 321, 124 S.E.2d 409 (1962) (jailor-prisoner); Tubbs v. Argus, 140 Ind. App. 695, 225
N.E.2d 841 (1967) (host-guest). According to Prosser, "there are undoubtedly other relationships
calling for the same conclusion." W. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 342. Cf Caldwell v. Bechtel, Inc.,
631 F.2d 989, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Courts have been eroding the general rule that there is no
duty to act to help another in distress, by creating exceptions based upon a relationship between the
actors.")
39. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976);
McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. Ct. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979). In Mavroudis v. Superior Ct.,
102 Cal. App. 3d 594 (1980), the court found Tarasoff controlling; the case will not be discussed here.




sions.*1 These precedents are of two kinds: the duty of a hospital to control
its patients; 42 and the duty of a doctor to protect third parties, usually
from contagious disease.4
However attractive the term "special relationship," the "special rela-
tionship" analysis is analytically vulnerable and lacks a principled basis
for acceptance by other courts. First, simply pronouncing that the psychia-
trist is involved in a "special relationship" does not even address the lib-
erty principle, which argues against the imposition of affirmative duties.
Second, the judicial method applying the label of "special relationship,"
without articulating the components of the relationship that create affirm-
ative duties, does not itself rise to the level of principled justification. As a
result, it contributes to precisely the plummet down the slippery slope of
prescribing affirmative duties that the intellectual tradition from Kant to
current commentators has warned against.44 To maintain the vitality of
the liberty principle, the law must not create a catch-all exception that
translates the personal moral preferences of judges into legal
requirements."
Third, the "relationship" of a psychiatrist to his patient is one of confi-
dentiality, and contends against, rather than for, a duty to warn potential
victims. 6 In contrast, the psychiatrist normally does not have any "special
relationship," nor in many cases even a personal acquaintance, with the
41. Id. at 436 nn. 7-8, 551 P.2d at 343-48 n.728, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24 nn.7-8; McIntosh v.
Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, at 489 n.20, 403 A.2d 500, 511-12 n.20, (1979). The California Su-
preme Court acknowledged that prior California decisions that had recognized a duty arising from
special relationships involved fact situations in which the defendant stood in such a relationship both
to the victim and to the person whose conduct created the danger, but asserted "we do not think that
the duty should be logically constricted to such situations." Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 436 & nn.7-8, 551
P.2d at 344 & nn.7-8, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23-4 & nn.7-8.
42. See Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966); Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d
288 (5th Cir. 1956), Merchants Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D.
1967); Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp., 432 P.2d 193, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1967).
43. See Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612 (1921); Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323,
173 N.W. 663 (1919), Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America, 18 Misc. 2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351
(1959). Cf Hofman v. Blackmon, 241 So.2d 752 (Fla. 1970) (duty to exercise reasonable care in
diagnosing contagious disease); Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 65 Wash. 2d 461, 398 P.2d 14
(1965) (duty to warn patient that condition or medication renders certain conduct, such as driving car,
dangerous).
44. See supra p. 1434.
45. See Scheid, The Affirmative Duty to Act in Emergency Situations-The Return of the Good
Samaritan, 3 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 1, 11 (1964). ("American Courts are obviously unhappy
with the rule [the refusal to require rescue] and have attempted to circumvent it."); Harper & Kime,
The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 895 (1934) ("In a number of these cases,
it seems apparent that the courts are struggling to find the appropriate basis of liability.")
46. "The confidences concerning individual or domestic life entrusted by a patient to a physician
and the defects of disposition or flaws of character observed in patients during medical attendance
should be held as a trust and should never be revealed except when required by the laws of the state."
AM. MED. ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS 3-4 (1978) (emphasis supplied). This concern for
confidentiality does not represent a legal principle of sufficient breadth and weight to rebut a legal
duty that might be based on independent grounds. See infra notes 52-53.
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person who might be harmed by his patient.
In addition to the "special relationship" label, the California Supreme
Court invoked the policy goal of protecting the "public interest in safety
from violent assault""7 to counter such arguments against the imposition
of a duty to warn as the public interest in supporting effective treatment
of mental illness, and the privacy rights of the patient.4' The public safety
argument faces conceptual problems similar to those of the "special rela-
tionships" doctrine. First, it does not explain why the liberty principle
should be overcome in this category of cases. The goal of public safety
presupposes that the maximization of net lives justifies the creation of a
legal duty, regardless of the imposition on liberty. This policy justification
alone, however, generally has not served to override the principle of indi-
vidual liberty, as the case law well indicates. 9
Second, a duty to warn might well be counterproductive to attaining the
policy goal of reducing violence. If a psychiatrist's duty to warn would
either deter persons from seeking treatment or hinder treatment by dis-
couraging full disclosure to the psychiatrist, then overall violent conduct
may be increased and public safety may be endangered rather than pro-
tected. 0 Empirical research has been inconclusive;" the public safety ar-
gument, like the "special relationship" label, may cut the other way and
does not provide a sound justification for a duty to warn. 2
47. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 440, 551 P.2d 334, 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 26 (1976). New Jersey, on the
other hand, recognizes that the mere realization that intervention is necessary for another's protection
does not of itself impose a duty to so intervene. McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 483, 403
A.2d 500, 508-09 (1979).
48. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 440, 551 P.2d 334, 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 26 (1976).
49. See supra pp. 1433-35.
50. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 460-62, 551 P.2d 334, 360-61, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 40-41 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting) [hereinafter referred to as the counterproductivity
argument).
51. Proponents of the duty to warn have denied that the counterproductivity argument has any
reliable statistical support and question whether it is even possible to establish such support. McIn-
tosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 496, 403 A.2d 500, 514 (1979). Further, these proponents point
to anecdotal evidence-the rapid expansion of psychiatric practice in jurisdictions requiring psychia-
trists to testify in court regarding the patient's mental condition, and the rapid expansion of group
therapy in response to the counterproductivity argument. See Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or
His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1025, 1043 (1974); Note, 6 SETON HALL
L. REv. 536, 546 (1975).
Opponents of the duty to warn bolster their empirical argument with clinical or intuitive support.
See Note, Imposing a Duty to Warn on Psychiatrists-A Judicial Threat to the Psychiatric Profes-
sion, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 293-95 (1977). They concede that psychiatry has flourished in juris-
dictions that do not recognize a psychiatrist's testimonial privilege but suggest that it would have
flourished even more had some patients not been deterred. See id. at 295.
The number of variables that might affect the use of psychiatry-income, age, occupation, region,
changes over time-and the problems in obtaining accurate data create formidable barriers to ob-
taining statistical support for either side. Cf E. TUFrE, DATA ANALYSIS FOR POLITICS AND POLICY
131-64 (1974) (multivariate analysis over time presents unique analytical problems).
52. A right to therapy might be derived from the entitlement of mental patients committed to state
hospitals to receive effective therapy. See Note, Imposing a Duty to Warn, supra note 51, at 286-96.
Courts advancing this entitlement have predicated it on two alternative theories: that mental patients
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II. An Alternative Basis for Liability
The failure of the special relationships doctrine and public safety con-
siderations to provide principled support for a psychiatrist's duty to pro-
tect a stranger's safety prompts two possible responses: a search for an
alternative principle of liability, or the abandonment of the duty in favor
of the liberty principle. A psychiatrist should be obligated to protect his
patient's intended victim only if a valid principle can be found to justify
imposition of the duty.
A. A Principle of Professional Obligation
An alternative "principle of professional obligation" can be derived
from an analysis of the factors relevant to liberty: when a person enters an
occupation in which he can reasonably expect to face an increased
probability of discovering a helpless or endangered person, he is required
to take steps to protect identified endangered persons.5 3
As discussed above, the law's general refusal to allow the Good
Samitarian principle to prevail is grounded on protection of liberty values
typically associated with contract. The law has decided that these liberty
values are safeguarded sufficiently in business relationships to require af-
firmative duties because the service-provider 1) has made a general choice
about how to exercise his labor by entering a trade, 2) reasonably can
foresee that other people will need particular forms of affirmative protec-
tion associated with the running of that business, and 3) can adjust his
compensation to cover the costs (risks) of providing that protection.1
4
committed to state hospitals that fail to provide effective therapy are subject to cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Constitution, see, e.g., People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d
373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975); People v. Wilkins, 23 A.D.2d 178, 259 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1965), or that
patients committed without therapy are therefore denied due process because they essentially are being
criminally punished without a determination of criminal guilt, see, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.
Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afi'd sub. nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974);
Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 499 (D. Minn. 1974); Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater
State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968).
This right to therapy cannot be extended to a psychiatrist's patient. Cases asserting a right to
therapy have made it clear that the entitlement was only by the denial of liberty occasioned by com-
mitment or imprisonment. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afi'd sub.
nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). This denial of liberty is not present in the
ordinary patient-psychiatrist relationship. Therefore, those raising the "interest in therapy" objection
cannot demonstrate that the "interest" is a legally cognizable one. C R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at
15-130 (one can only demonstrate that an interest is legally cognizable by reference to other rules or
principles).
53. To enunciate this particular principle of professional obligation is not to deny the existence of
other legal principles. Therefore, in order to adopt concrete rights and duties applying to each profes-
sion, the law would need to account for the competing principles unique to each profession. For
example, a valid rule applying to journalists would need to take First Amendment principles into
consideration. A valid rule as applied to chemical researchers would consider the principles governing
assignment of liability in a corporation.
54. See supra p. 1435.
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These three liberty values are protected in imposing a duty to rescue on
the psychiatrist. The psychiatrist chooses a profession that foreseeably in-
creases the probability of his encountering endangered persons; he is
paid;"5 and he can adjust his compensation to reflect additional risks or
costs associated with his labor. 6 All the material and discrete analytical
factors that apply in "contractual relationships" that justify affirmative
duties apply as well in the psychiatric context. Therefore, based on the
underlying Good Samaritan and liberty principles that operate to create
duties to rescue in "business relationships," there exists a duty to protect
the patient's intended victim. 7
B. Advantages Over Special Relationships Doctrine and
Public Safety Considerations
The principle of professional obligation overcomes the analytical defi-
ciencies of both the "special relationships" doctrine and the public safety
arguments that courts have used to impose a duty to rescue on
psychiatrists.
First, the principle clearly and directly addresses the liberty issue. The
liberty arguments that are normally invoked to defeat the duty to warn
apply here with only the faintest force. Unlike the "uncompensated ser-
vant," the psychiatrist could have avoided encountering the endangered
55. The logic of the business relationship and professional obligation principle cases does not
require that the defendant receive payment from the particular plaintiff, but that he is paid for the
business and profession in ways that allow him to distribute the costs of his risks of affirmative duties.
56. It might be objected that it is somehow unfair to shift some of the costs to prospective patients.
Such an objection would not be a very potent one. Each patient would pay a "premium" for the risk
he presents to a psychiatrist that he will threaten violence and that the psychiatrist will need to take
affirmative steps. This premium will internalize the costs of the transaction, giving equal respect to
the liberty of the psychiatrist and the liberty of the patient to strike a fair deal.
57. The concern for confidentiality represents a tenuous legal principle that accedes to a legal duty
to the contrary. The professional code of ethics explicitly recognizes that confidences should not be
revealed except when required by law. See supra note 46. The concern for confidentiality does not
rebut a legal duty based on a valid rule or principle.
At common law, even in the absence of a legal duty to disclose, doctors have not been held liable for
disclosure to advance a significant interest despite the patient's expectation of confidentiality. See, e.g.,
Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962) (physician informed insurance company of
patient's heart trouble); Clark v. Geraci, 28 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1960) (doctor informed
patient's employer of patient's alcoholism); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958)
(doctor informed parents of patient's fiancee that patient was manic-depressive).
Although it could also be argued that the constitutional right of privacy encompasses the right to
have personal information kept secret, the Supreme Court has not yet extended the right of privacy
that far. See generally Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 670 (1973) (if "privacy" included right to keep personal information secret, it would be
stretched to resemble substantive due process, which was discarded because it represented unstruc-
tured judicial fiat in determination of unenumerated rights). Rather, in its privacy decisions since
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court has recognized under the rubric of "pri-
vacy" the autonomous right to make personal choices such as that regarding abortion, see Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and the right to be free from governmental intrusions in the home, see
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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person and can ensure that he is compensated for the increased risk of
having to help such a person."
Second, the principle of professional obligation places a discernible limit
on the extension of affirmative duties. 9 Unlike the open-ended public
safety argument, which would seem to require affirmative duties when-
ever the most net lives could be saved, and unlike the malleable "special
relationships" doctrine, this principle specifies three clear conditions that
must be met in order for the duty to rescue to apply. Moreover, the pro-
fessional obligation principle indicates that the party to whom the psychi-
atrist owes a duty is the patient's intended victim, whose peril is revealed
as a result of a purposeful course of action undertaken by the psychiatrist.
The "special relationship" of a doctor to his patient, on the other hand,
suggests a cross-cutting, if limited, concern of confidentiality for that
patient.6 0
In contrast to the public safety argument, the professional obligation
theory is based on a principled duty to an identified victim, not on empiri-
cal forecasts about some general impact on society as a whole. The princi-
ple is valid even if a duty to warn does not necessarily serve the policy
58. This principle might be criticized on the ground that, when first enunciated, it would apply to
people who entered the profession before they were aware of this tort obligation. The liability imposed
on those people might seem to be retroactive. Under a Dworkin analysis, though, those who were not
aware of the tort obligations made the mistake of positivism in assuming that "law" consists only of
explicit rules. Even when an explicit rule does not exist, principles govern. See supra note 11.
59. The "professional obligation" formulation more tightly cabins the affirmative duty than do
other formulations that have been derived from contract analysis. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 18.
This article argues that, if the point of refusing to require rescue is to affirm freedom of contract
values, the helplessness of the victim undercuts (because of duress) the characteristics of a valid con-
tract. In this sort of emergency, there are no liberty of contract values to be vindicated by the absence
of a tort duty. Id. at 271-72. This analysis, however, cannot be applied to the fact situation of the
patient's intended victim, because the victim is not under duress. The victim does not know that he
has been threatened, but the psychiatrist does.
The more general problem with the Weinrib analysis, however, is that it does not successfully
answer the slippery slope problem. See supra p. 1434. The article attempts to distinguish a rescue
requirement from a wealth redistribution requirement in the following manner. "In the rescue con-
text, the resource to be expended (time and effort directed at aiding the victim) cannot be traded on
the market and no administrative scheme could be established to ensure the socially desirable level of
benefits. In the charity context, by contrast, the resource to be expended (money) can be traded on the
market, and an administrative scheme could be established not only to ensure the socially desirable
level of benefits but to do so at a lower social cost than a judicially enforced duty in tort, or so the
welfare state assumes." Id. at 272.
The first branch of this distinction is untenable. Time and effort (labor) can surely be traded on the
market. People often plan the use of their time (with dates, appointments, meetings, schedules, etc.)
and interrupting those plans with unexpected rescue attempts carries an economic cost; time is money.
The second branch does not clearly succeed either. It may well be that an administrative scheme
(police, fire departments, rescue squads, public health clinics), because of superior skill and equip-
ment, could do a more efficient job of saving lives than a general tort duty to rescue. There doesn't
seem to be any a priori reason to assume that the welfare office does a better job than the rescue
squad.
The principle of professional obligation, by contrast, more successfully delimits the affirmative duty
and distinguishes the wealth redistribution (charity) context.
60. See supra note 57.
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goal of reducing overall violence."' This duty to an identified life is a criti-
cal feature; the law does not permit risking a predetermined, identifiable
life in order to protect unidentified members of society, present or future,
as a means of maximizing net lives. Once an individual life to whom a
duty is owed has been identified, it is treated as "a pearl beyond price,
' 62
and that person's rights cannot be sacrificed for the overall maximization
of life. 3
61. The public safety rationale justifies legal duties on the basis of saving the most net lives. In
the area of criminal law, this position, which might be characterized as "life utilitarianism," has been
explicitly rejected. The most renowned expression of this rejection is R. v. Dudley & Stephens, 14
Q.B.D. 273 (1884). In this case, four men had been adrift in an open boat. After seven days without
food and five without water, two of the four decided that someone had to be sacrificed in order to save
the others. They decided against drawing lots, but rather chose to put to death the youngest of the
group. They were then rescued. The jury found that, if the men had not fed upon the boy, they
probably would not have survived. Nonetheless, the Court found the two defendants guilty of murder.
62. See C. FRIED, ANATOMY OF VALUES 207-36 (1970); Calabresi, Reflections on Medical Exper-
imentation in Humans, 98 DAEDALUS 378 (1969). According to Professor Calabresi, there is a deep
conflict between the need to reaffirm our belief in the sanctity of life and the practical need to place
some values above an individual life. Society tolerates the taking of life as long as the taking is not a
blatant sacrifice of an identified individual, but rather indirect, such as the result of a market mecha-
nism. Id. at 389. Taking a life is tolerable as long as society can create a sufficiently complex system
for doing so, in order to obscure the taking and delude itself into believing that it still respects individ-
ual lives above all. Id. at 390.
Calabresi's rejection of a principled moral basis for refusing to risk the life of an identified individ-
ual is not convincing, because he does not convincingly rebut the moral arguments. He rejects the idea
that actual consent represents a tenable distinction between the risks that are regulated by a reasona-
ble care standard and those that are flatly prohibited (risks to identified lives), but it is not sufficient to
reject that one point. As this Note discusses, actual consent is not the sole test of whether a rule has a
principled moral basis. The issue is whether people in the initial position of constructing a just society
would agree to a system distributing risks where no one is especially disadvantaged, that is, where
each person gains the right to perform risky activities upon others in the pursuit of his own ends in
exchange for granting others the right to do the same to him. See R. NOZICK, supra note 9, at 54-87.
The procedure for determining the fairness of legal rules, not by establishing actual consent, but by
discerning the principles that rational people would choose in initially designing a society, is well
established. See J. PAWLS, supra note 9.
63. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
The principled justification for not sacrificing an identified life to whom a duty is owed in order to
save future lives is explained by what is called the theory of a "risk pool." See C. FRIED, ANATOMY
OF VALUES 183-200 (1970). All persons contribute to a common pool of risks that they may impose
upon each other, and on which they may draw when pursuing ends of the appropriate degree of
seriousness. See R. NOZICK, supra note 9, at 73-78.
According to the risk pool theory, principles of equity are violated when a specific individual is
placed at risk in order to reduce the risks to other people in the community. The specific individual
does not have an equal right to perform risky activities upon others in the pursuit of his own ends.
Therefore, the law does not allow an identified predetermined individual life to be sacrificed or risked
in order to reduce the risk to others, except in the most narrow circumstances: (1) when the individual
consents, as in agreeing to medical experimentation or joining the fire department, or (2) when an
accountable political process with broad participation (a legislature) determines the extraordinary ne-
cessity of violating the general risk-pool principle, and then does so by using a random method for
identifying the individuals to be risked (such as a draft lottery).
The draft lottery can be distinguished in two ways from a tort rule that would allow individuals to
risk the lives of identified victims. The first distinction lies in the nature of the political process decid-
ing that an identified individual may be risked. The law does not permit an individual to decide that
another person's life may be risked, because the risked person does not get any fair chance to be heard
or to have his views expressed. The second distinction focuses on the extraordinary necessity that
justifies a draft lottery-war or the threat of war. An exception is made to the "risk pool" concept
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Finally, the principle of professional obligation satisfactorily explains in
a unified manner the affirmative obligations that have been imposed on
professionals through a variety of existing rationales." The professional
obligation principle explains why a doctor is required to protect those who
might be infected by his patient's disease."5 Similarly, a lawyer is not pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege from his obligation to disclose a cli-
ent's intention to commit a future crime. 6 Also, child abuse statutes typi-
cally require professionals familiar with the abuse to take steps to protect
the child." The principle therefore exposes the underlying reasons for
those duties, whatever the doctrine in which they may be clothed.
The principle of professional obligation therefore represents the most
cogent and internally consistent synthesis of the legal principles that define
both "liberty" and "liability" in this area. As such, the principle is law.
III. The Appropriate Threshold of Danger and Discharge of the Duty
The law's refusal to sanction risking the life of an identified person to
whom a tort duty is owed has important implications for determining the
appropriate standard of care for the psychiatrist.
A. Problems with Two Proposed Standards
To determine the level of probability at which a risk to a potential
victim becomes "unreasonable," courts have historically weighed the grav-
ity of the possible harm against the interests sacrificed by avoiding the
risk.6 When the gravity of possible harm is a threat to an identified life,
only when the very prerequisite of the pool, the social order allowing equal freedom to pursue one's
own ends, itself is threatened.
A principled moral basis, therefore, explains the law's refusal to sacrifice an identified individual in
order to advance the interests of society. The principle of professional obligation coincides with this
moral basis and maintains a duty to warn regardless of whether such a duty saves the most net lives.
64. "If we were challenged to back up our claim that some principle is a principle of law, we
would mention any prior cases in which the principle was cited, or figured in the argument. We
would also mention any statute that seemed to exemplify the principle .... " R. DWORK1N, supra
note 4, at 66.
65. See, e.g., Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America, 18 Misc. 2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1959);
Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612 (1921); Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W.
663 (1919).
66. See U.S. v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The legal profession has clothed these
affirmative obligations not in the "special relationships" rationale, but in an equally diaphanous ratio-
nale of professional obligation, the concept that the lawyer is "an officer of the Court." The present
draft of the ABA Code of Professional Ethics requires a lawyer to "disclose information about the
client to the extent necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in death or serious bodily injury to a person." MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 25 (ABA Committee Draft 1981). In most
jurisdictions, the ABA Code is adopted as rules of court and thus has the force of positive law.
67. See S. HALLECK, LAW IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 186 (1980); Paulsen, Child Abuse
Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 (1967).
68. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), in which Learned
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and a duty has been established to that life, the "pearl beyond price"
evaluation of such a life69 results in the risk being consistently deemed
"unreasonable" even when the probability of injury to the victim is very
small-perhaps even when the risk "only goes beyond the realm of every-
day risks."7 In order to remain faithful to the principles of tort law, alter-
native thresholds of danger should be assessed against this evaluation.
Two standards have been prominently advanced to trigger a psychia-
trist's duty to warn. These are the psychiatrist's actual prediction,7' and
utilization of the "standards of the profession" to determine whether the
patient presented "a serious danger of violence to another." 2 Each of
these standards presents difficulties. The first standard presents a formida-
ble problem of proof. It is difficult to determine whether a psychiatrist
actually predicted that a patient would act on his threats without the psy-
chiatrist's own incriminating testimony.73 This standard also suffers from
the use of the word "predict," which seems to imply that a psychiatrist
should determine if the violence is more likely than not, which is too high
a standard because it violates the tort principles that attach when a duty
to an individual life has been established.74
The alternative approach, which uses the standards of the profession to
determine whether the patient presented "a serious danger of violence to
another,"" avoids the formidable proof problems of actual prediction. It
suffers, however, from the same problem of establishing a level of
probability consistent with principles of tort law concerning the proper
conduct when there is a risk to an identified life. It must therefore be
tailored. The "standards of the profession" should be calibrated so that
the duty to warn is triggered when the threat to life goes beyond the realm
of frivolous or everyday risks, which is the threshold of danger that ap-
plies when a duty is owed to an individual life.
6
Hand expressed the formula as: "if the probability be called P, the injury L; and the burden, B;
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL."
69. See supra p. 1442.
70. See C. FRIED, supra note 62, at 207-36.
71. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal.3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 353-54, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14,
33-34 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
72. Id.
73. Note, Duty Imposed on Psychotherapists to Exercise Reasonable Care to Warn Potential
Victims of Foreseeably Imminent Danger Posed by Mentally III Patients, 6 SETON HALL L. REV.
536, 546 (1975).
74. See supra p. 1442.
75. See supra p. 1444 & n.71.
76. For general discussions of psychiatry's attempts to evaluate the likelihood of a patient's acting
on threats, see S. HALLECK, THE POLITICS OF THERAPY 162 (1971); D. MECHANIC, MENTAL
HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 144 (1969); J. RAPPEPORT, THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF THE DAN-
GEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1967); KOZOL, BOUCHER, & GAROFALO, The Diagnosis and
Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 371, 384 (1972); MacDonald, The Threat to
Kill, AM. J. PSYCH. 120, 125-30 (1963). Empirical evidence indicates that several hypothetical factors
are not significantly related to the prediction of whether or not a patient will make good on his threat;
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B. Discharge of the Duty
Analysis of the principles underlying the "business relationship" cases
also indicates how the duty to protect third parties should be discharged."
In order to be consistent with the liberty principle as expressed in "busi-
ness relationship" affirmative duties, the professional must be -able to
cover the costs of the increased risk of encountering and having to assist
endangered parties in the fees he normally receives for services. 8 As a
practical matter, the psychiatrist generally would fulfill his duty by giving
a timely warning to the potential victim. 79 If after receiving the warning
the potential victim calls the police or initiates a commitment proceeding,
as he may do in several jurisdictions, the psychiatrist should be required
to corroborate the warning. If a reasonable person would not believe that
the intended victim could protect himself adequately after a timely warn-
ing, such as by not associating with the patient, by locking doors, or by
securing increased protection, the psychiatrist should be required to initi-
ate emergency detention, if the jurisdiction allowed it,8" or initiate civil
commitment proceedings, if he believed the patient met the jurisdiction's
requisite standard of dangerousness for commitment.8 '
By acting in this manner, a psychiatrist will discharge his professional
obligations in a manner prescribed by principled reasoning. He would be-
have according to a rule that explicitly takes into account the respective
rights of the psychiatrist, patient, and victim, and not just a judge's ran-
dom idea of the greater social good.
these include parental brutality, parental seduction, childhood firesetting, cruelty to animals, enuresis
to the age of five or beyond, alcoholism, and attempted suicide. J. MACDONALD, HOMICIDAL
THREATS 21-73 (1968).
77. The Tarasoff case held that the therapist bore a duty to "exercise reasonable care to protect
the foreseeable victim of that danger." Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 439, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 22, 551 P.2d 334, 344 (1976).
78. See supra p. 1439. A psychiatrist could not reasonably be expected to "internalize" certain
high-cost risks, such as endangering his own life.
79. In the Tarasoff and McIntosh cases, if the victims had not voluntarily associated with the
killers, their lives would have been spared. See supra note 1.
80. This can only be done in certain jurisdictions. See S. HALLECK, supra note 76, at 119.
81. Id. at 140.
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